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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the Industcial Commission's finding that Plaintiff 
failed to demonstrate that she sustained injuries as the result of 
a compensable industrial accident arbitrary and capricious? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying Plaintiffs Motion for Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of an incident which occurred on 
Friday, May 3, 1985, At that time, Plaintiff was 25 years old and 
worked at Sperry Corporation where her job was to pull computer 
units out of the ovens, lift them, and place them on a conveyor 
belt. She had worked at that task for approximately six months. 
R. 21-22. On the day of the incident she was lifting a unit 
weighing approxi- mately 30 pounds when she felt a tingling or 
popping in her back. R. 22, 41. At the time of her injury, she 
was picking up the unit in the same way she normally did; she was 
"just doing her daily job at work." Nothing unusual occurred. 
R. 30, 33. 
Plaintiff reported the incident shortly afterwards, but 
worked for the rest of the day. The following Monday, she went to 
the nurse's station at Sperry and was later examined by 
Dr. Henderson. R. 24. Plaintiff was later examined by several 
other doctors. Dr. Chester B. Powell examined her on August 6, 
1985. He noted that "there is a significant disparity between 
Ms, Herrera's complaints and any evidence clinically or by X-rays 
of any real pathology." R. 9-11. (A copy of this letter is 
included in the Addendum to this Brief.) 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded in her Order of 
November 27, 1985 that "G. Carmen Herrera has failed in her burden 
to demonstrate that she sustained injuries as the result of a 
compensable industrial accident on May 3, 1985, and her claim for 
benefits should be denied." The Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact state in part that, "[t]here is nothing to take 
her activity on that day out of the realm of what could be 
considered usual and normal activities. Under Applicant's 
description, the same type of injury could have just as easily 
occurred had she bent down to pick up a clothes basket or a bag of 
groceries." R. 90. The Industrial Commission denied Plaintiffs 
Motion for Review and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's 
Order on January 2, 1986. R. 103. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a 
timely Petition for Review to this Court on January 29, 1986. 
R.105. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
Industrial Commission's finding that Plaintiff did not suffer a 
compensable industrial accident. Moreover, there is a wealth of 
authority, including one case with strikingly similar facts, which 
support the Commission's finding of no accident in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION MUST BE "WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE" 
TO PERMIT REVERSAL 
The standard of review exercised by this Court in cases 
appealing decisions of the Industrial Commission is well 
established. In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 
888, 890 (Utah 1981) ("Monfredi"), this Court stated: 
[i]t is apparent that this Court's function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a 
strictly limited one in which the question is not 
whether the Court agrees with the Commission's 
findings or whether they are supported by the 
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the 
reviewing court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or 
capricious," or "wholly without cause" or 
contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from 
the evidence" or without "any substantial 
evidence" to support them. Only then should the 
Commission's findings be displaced. 
631 P.2d at 890. This standard was reaffirmed in Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1982). Accord, Billings 
Computer Corporation v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah 1983); 
Moyes, ex rel. Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1985) 
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard); and Emery Mining 
Corporation v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1984). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-84 (1953) permits the Supreme Court 
to set aside a decision of the Commission only upon the following 
grounds: (1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of 
its powers; or (2) that the findings of fact do not support the 
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award. In Blaine v. Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 
(Utah 1985), the Court stated that "the Commission's findings are 
not to be displaced in the absence of a showing that they are 
arbitrary and capricious'1, and went on to state that: 
If there is a reasonable basis for the 
evidence (or lack of evidence) such that 
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could 
remain unpersuaded, this Court does not upset the 
determination made. 
700 P.2d at 1086, quoting Martinsen v. W-M Insurance Agency, 606 
P.2d 256 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted) (discussing the standard 
for altering findings of fact) . 
In summary, the issue in this case is very narrow; whether 
the one inevitable conclusion of the evidence is that an accident 
occurred. If it is not, the Commission's finding must be affirmed. 
In this case, Plaintiff allegedly suffered her injury while 
performing her every-day tasks in exactly the same manner as she 
always performed them. She had no prior history of back trouble. 
Nothing unusual occurred at the time of the so-called incident, 
and Plaintiff was under no unusual stress. Finally, there is 
conflicting medical evidence as to whether Plaintiff's complaints 
are evidenced by any real pathology. Therefore, it is clear that 
the Commission's finding of no compensable industrial accident is 
not wholly without cause, and must be sustained under the standard 
of review set forth by this Court. 
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II. NO CASES SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S POSITION. 
Since this Court's decisions in this area are numerous 
and their results turn in large part upon the facts of each 
individual case, it is helpful to differentiate between them 
according to the procedural stance with which the Court was faced. 
Of the cases cited in the Plaintiff's brief, only two involved an 
attempt, as in this case, by an applicant to reverse the 
Commission's denial of benefits, Carling v. Industrial Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) ("Schmidt"). In Carling, the 
Court affirmed the denial of benefits on the basis that there was 
Ma reasonable basis in the evidence to support the Commission's 
conclusion that the Plaintiff's loss of hearing did not result 
from a single incident, nor from an "accident" arising out of or 
in the course of his employment." 399 P.2d at 204. In Schmidt, 
the Court reversed the Commission's finding of no accident. A 
review of the case law reveals two other cases where employees 
succeeded in having the Commission's denial of benefits reversed, 
Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984), and 
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah 1977). However, each of those three cases is distinguish-
able from the present case on their facts. 
In Giles, the administrative law judge's finding that 
there had been a compensable accident was summarily reversed 
without a hearing by the Industrial Commission. This Court 
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reversed the Commission and affirmed the administrative law 
judge's original finding of an accident, noting that the 
Plaintiff's detached retina occurred when he attempted to open his 
delivery truck door which was so severely jammed that a power jack 
was later required to open it. The Court felt that this clearly 
placed the event within its definition of accident as an "unan-
ticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally 
be expected to occur in the usual course of events." 692 P.2d at 
746, quoting Monfredi, 631 P.2d at 890. The Court noted that: 
Giles' injury, on the other hand, did not result from a 
commonplace or usual incident. A badly jammed delivery 
truck door is neither a commonplace occurrence nor one 
liable to happen anywhere but work. Further, a jar to 
the body resulting from an attempt to open that door is 
not usual. 
692 P.2d at 746. 
In Nuzum, the Court reversed the Commission's denial of 
death benefits to the surviving children of a worker who died of a 
heart attack after repeatedly climbing the six feet in and out of 
the cab of his truck. The Court stressed that his multiple trips 
in and out of the cab were necessitated by a mechanical defect in 
the truck, which "put him to a greater exertion than normally 
would have been required if the truck had been operating properly" 
565 P.2d at 1146. Unlike Giles or Nuzum, the Plaintiff in this 
case neither encountered any unusual situation, nor was required 
to use any unusual exertion in performing the task which she 
claims led to the injuries. 
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The Schmidt case is distinguishable on several grounds. 
In that case, the Plaintiff, who had a long history of back 
disorders, injured his back in the course of his duties of 
carrying steel which he cut to specified sizes. The case appears 
to be a forerunner of the "climax" rule applied in the Kaiser 
Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) 
(permitting recovery for injuries suffered as "climax" due 
to exertion, stress, or other repetitive cause). In the present 
case, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff had any prior 
history of back trouble, nor that the strain that allegedly 
occurred on May 3th was the result of a "climax". Secondly, 
Schmidt seems to be heavily influenced by the statutory require-
ment that all cases be submitted to a medical panel. That portion 
of the law of the case has since been legislatively reversed by 
the 1982 amendments to Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-77 (1953, as 
amended). It is not clear what the result in Schmidt would have 
been if the Court had not felt that referral of medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel was mandatory under the Workmen's 
Compensation statute. Finally, it should be noted that Schmidt 
was a 3 to 2 decision, with no one joining Justice Maughan in the 
"main" opinion. In some ways, Schmidt appears to be an anamoly 
since the dissenters in it were in the majority in leading 
Workmen's Compensation cases both and before and after Schmidt, 
i.e., Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980), and Sabo, 642 P.2d at 722. 
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Conversely, a number of recent cases have affirmed 
denials of compensation by the Commission, just as Defendants ask 
the Court to do in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Ogden Auto 
Body, 646 P.2d 703 (Utah 1982) (substantial evidence supported 
finding of no accident); Moyes ex rel. Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 
748 (Utah 1985) (worker's accident was not a significant factor in 
causing the injury); Blaine v. Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 
1084 (Utah 1985) (Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from psychological 
problems and not from her industrial injury). 
Finally, it is instructive to note that in all the cases 
relied on below to determine that there was no accident in this 
case, the Court reversed the Commission's award of benefits, 
rather than merely affirming the Commission's denial of benefits, 
as Defendants urge in this case. Redman Warehousing Corporation 
v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969) 
("Redman"); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Commission and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) 
("Thurman"); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 
(Utah 1980) ("Mason"); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 
Utah 1982) ("Sabo"); and Billings Computer Corporation v. Tarango, 
674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) ("Tarango"). 
III. SABO DIRECTLY CONTROLS ON THE ISSUE OF ACCIDENT 
AND REQUIRES AFFIRMING THE COMMISSION'S DECISION. 
In Sabo's Electric Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982), this Court reversed the Industrial Commission's award of 
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benefits, holding that its conclusion that an accident had 
occurred was without any substantive support in the record. The 
facts in that case are strikingly similar to this one and that 
decision should control the outcome in this case. In Sabo, the 
plaintiff injured his back while attempting to lift a box of clock 
radios. The Court stated that 
[t]hough it is clear that the applicant was 
engaged in his regular employment and that there 
was an injury, we cannot find that there was an 
accident in the sense contemplated by the 
Workmen's Compensation Statutes. 
642 P.2d at 724. The Court went on to state, M[t]he mere showing 
of injury does not ipso facto mean that a compensable accident has 
occurred." id., at 725. The Court discussed the Redman, Farmer's 
Grain, and Thurman decisions (discussed below), and concluded that 
"[i]t appears to be mere coincidence that defendant's injury or 
malfunction occurred at work. Defendant bears the burden of 
showing otherwise." 642 P.2d at 726 (footnotes omitted). In both 
Sabo and the present case, the applicant's job required "a lot of 
lifting", Sabo at 723, and the activities were "not unusual and 
were not strenuous in any way . . . . [The applicant] was doing 
the same things that he frequently did in connection with his 
employ- ment in loading boxes which usually required bending over 
to pick them up. He had done the same thing many times in the 
past." Sabo at 723-724 (quoting the administrative law judge's 
findings). 
The administrative law judge went on to state, in a passage which 
could have easily been used in the findings in this case, that: 
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We cite the case of L.D.S. Church v. Thurman 
[Utah, 590 P.2d 328 (1980)] and find here, as 
found in that case, that "there is nothing in his 
testimony that shows anything unusual about his 
activities, that shows any unusual exertion or 
strain or that shows any contact with objects or 
a fall. There is simply nothing different about 
his activities on the day in question than any 
other such working day." It is obvious that the 
back failure could have occurred at any time 
while engaged in any activity on or off work 
since our ordinary day to day activities require 
us to bend over, turn, twist, and lift many times 
and in many different ways. 
642 P.2d at 724. 
The record in this case makes it clear that the plaintiff 
was doing everyday activities in her usual way at the time she 
felt a sensation in her back. R. 30. Similarly, the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, which were adopted by 
the Industrial Commission, state: 
Additionally, she (plaintiff) indicated very 
clearly on the record that her normal procedure 
in lifting the parts was to squat, lift, and 
straighten and then turn to place them on the 
conveyer belt. She testified that there was no 
variation from this procedure on May 3, 1985. 
There is nothing to take her activity on that day 
out of the realm of what could be considered 
usual and normal activities. Under applicant's 
description, the same type of injury could have 
just as easily occurred had she bent down to pick 
up a clothes basket or bag of groceries. 
R. 90. The disposition of this case is controlled by the Court's 
decision in Sabo, which was made under a much stricter standard of 
review since there the Court reversed the Commission, and 
therefore Commission's Order in this case should be affirmed. 
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Plaintiff's Brief attempts to distinguish Sabo and other 
cases such as Redman, Mason, and Thurman on the ground that there 
was no finding of causation between the accident and the injury in 
those cases while there was such a showing here. This analysis 
not only mischaracterizes the holdings of those cases, but is 
inapplicable to this case in light of the lack of any finding of 
causation. 
A. There Was No Finding of Causation In This Case. 
The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Facts, which 
were adopted by the Industrial Commission, list the issues 
presented as including (1) whether the applicant sustained 
injuries as a result of a compensable industrial accident on 
May 3, 1985, and (2) the cause or relationship of the incident to 
the applicant's alleged injuries. The findings then go on to 
state that "Inasmuch as one of the above-listed issues is 
dispositive of the others, the Administrative Law Judge will deal 
only with the issue of whether the applicant sustained injuries as 
a result of a compensable industrial accident." R. 88. Therefore, 
by its own terms, the disposition by the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Industrial Commission does not reach the issue of 
causation on which plaintiff relies to distinguish Sabo. 
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence in the record to 
establish causation. Plaintiff relies solely on the report of 
Dr. Gene R. Smith, dated September 24, 1985, R. 48-50, which 
states that: 
-11-
In answer to the question of causal relationship, 
it would appear medically probable in my opinion, 
that the lumbar disc problem in Karmen (sic) 
Herrera was causally related to the lifting and 
twisting of the 30-40 pound weights in her 
occupation. 
This is not conclusive since in Sabo, where the plaintiff maintains 
there was no such causal relationship, the Court stated that: 
There is nothing in the doctor's evaluation which 
would justify a change from the initial decision 
that no MaccidentM occurred. The mere fact that 
defendant's impairment resulted (in th€> words of 
Dr. Momberger) "entirely from the incident which 
he alleges to" should not imply that a compens-
able accident has occurred, as defined in this 
opinion. 
642 P.2d at 726 (emphasis added). In that case, the doctor's 
evaluation seems to be much more strongly worded as to casuation 
than in this case, but Plaintiff claims that although there was no 
finding of causation in Sabo, there was such a "showing" in this 
In any event, there is additional and contradictory 
evidence in this case which casts doubt on both the physical basis 
of applicant's complaints and on their source of origin. In the 
letter from Dr. Chester B. Powell to Dr. Mark V. Anderson, dated 
August 10, 1985 (just over a month prior to Dr. Smith's letter), 
R. 9-11, Doctor Powell states that: "I think that there is a 
significant disparity between Ms. Herrera's complaints and any 
evidence clinically or by X-rays of any real pathology" and he 
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goes on to indicate that there is a "probable psychophysiologic 
reaction" in this case, and that "appropriate consultation would 
be advisable" if time suggests that the psychophysiologic factor 
is a large element in Ms. Herrera's discomfort. Cf., Blaine v. 
Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985) (affirming a 
denial of benefits for an applicant whose "complaints stem not 
from the industrial injury, but from psychological problems." 700 
P.2d at 1087). If Sabo is not distinguishable on causation 
grounds as suggested by Plaintiff, then it controls the outcome in 
this case and requires affirming the Commission. 
B. An "Accident" in Cases Like This Requires an Unusual 
Event or Exertion. 
The definition of accident throughout all these cases is 
well settled. From Carling v. Industrial Commission on, the Court 
has 
consistently held that a finding of accident 
hinges on "an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence different from what would normally be 
expected to occur in the usual course of events." 
Emery Mining Corporation v. DeFrieze, 694 P.2d 606 at 608 (Utah 
1984), quoting Carling, 399 P.2d at 203. 
Except for the "climax" cases such as Kaiser Steel 
Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d at 888, recent cases which have 
affirmed awards of benefits stress some unusual event, or unusual 
exertion by the applicant. For example, in Champion Home Builders 
v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985), the applicant 
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suffered a perforated ulcer when lifting an "unusually heavy beam" 
— one which was usually carried by two people. Similarly, in 
Emery Mining Corporation v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d at 606, the Court in 
a per curiam decision held that the applicant suffered a compens-
able accident when he injured his back while rapidly sliding out 
of a crawlspace and twisting to stand up to avoid being sprayed 
with hot oil. In Frito-Lay Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 
1985), the Court upheld benefits awarded for the applicant's back 
injury which occurred as he was loading Cheetos onto his truck. 
The Court noted that it was an unusual occurrence, because usually 
he hand-loaded the truck, but due to the large amount of product 
in this instance he was using a dolly, which directly led to the 
accident. Similarly, in IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1978), the Court affirmed the Commission's finding that the 
injury had resulted from an "extraordinary exertion in the course 
of his work which produced an unusual and unanticipated result and 
thus comes within the definition of an accident." Id., at 830 
(emphasis added). In Pittsburg Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983), the Court affirmed the award of death 
benefits where the decedent had a heart attack following working 
inside an extremely hot (100 to 125°F) building. 
On the other hand, the Court has continued to reverse 
awards of benefits if the applicant fails to meet his burden of 
showing the occurrence of an accident. See, Billings Computer 
Corporation v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983). In that case 
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the applicant injured her knee when she knelt down to pick up some 
small items off the floor. The Court quoted extensively from 
Sabo, and stated: 
The circumstances which precipitated her 
injury were in no way unusual or accidental, as 
that term is explained above. As noted 
previously, her testimony of these events is that 
she knelt down in the normal and usual way and 
that she did not fall and strike her knee on the 
floor, but rather placed it on the floor without 
abrupt contact. In light of these facts, we 
conclude that Mrs. Tarango did not meet her 
burden of showing a compensable accident and that 
the Industrial Commission's conclusion to that 
effect was "contrary to the 'one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence.'" We therefore 
vacate the Commission's order and award of 
benefits. 
674 P.2d at 107 quoting from Monfredi, 631 P.2d at 888. Similarly, 
in this case the plaintiff has failed to establish that the 
circumstances which precipitated her injury were in any way 
unusual or "accidental" and therefore, she did not meet her burden 
of showing a compensable accident. 
C. The Decisions in Sabo, et al., Turn Upon the Finding 
of "No Accident", Rather Than a Lack of Causation. 
As stated above, plaintiff attempts to distinguish Sabo 
by asserting that the decision there and those in Redman, Mason, 
and Thurman turn upon a lack of causation between the injury and 
the accident. A more careful reading of the cases indicates that 
in each of those cases the Court determined that no compensable 
accident occurred, just as the Commission found in this case. 
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While it is difficult to separate the question of the accident's 
existence from the question of causation, the case law clearly 
indicates that the analysis is a two-step process. Schmidt, 612 
P.2d at 695; Sabo, 642 P.2d at 725. It is equally clear that it 
is the Commission's responsibility to make findings of fact such 
as the existence of the accident. See, e.g., U.S. Steel 
Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980); 
Emery Mining Corporation v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1984) 
("A finding of accident . . . is primarily a factual question best 
left to the Commission."); Sabo, 642 P.2d at 725. 
Rather than turning on a finding of no causation, as 
claimed by Plaintiff, the Court in Redman, where the applicant 
suffered a herniated disc while driving a truck, stated: 
[t]here is nothing in this record that shows any 
unusual event or 'accident' if you please, 
justifying compensability within the nature, 
intent or spirit of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 
454 P.2d at 285 (reversing the Commission's award of benefits). 
In Thurman the Court also reversed an award of benefits. 
It quoted extensively from Redman and stated: 
The evidence does not support the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that an "accident" had 
arisen out of or in the course of Thurman's 
employment. 
590 P.2d at 330. In that case, the applicant experienced pain in 
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his back upon standing to answer a telephone. Similarly, in 
Mason, the Court reversed an award of benefits, stating that Mthe 
record before us does not support the Commission's conclusion that 
an accident arose out of or in the course of defendant's 
employment," 606 P.2d at 240, where the applicant injured his back 
while unloading 100-pound bags from his truck. As discussed 
above, the Sabo Court held that "the Commission's conclusion that 
an accident occurred is without any substantive support in the 
record." 642 P.2d at 726. In that case, the applicant was merely 
picking up a box of clock radios in the usual way in the course of 
his employment. 
To the extent causation is a factor in the decisions in 
these cases, the proposition they stand for was well stated in 
Kennecott Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 675 P.2d 
1187, 1191 (Utah 1983): 
The general rule concerning causation is that an 
employee cannot recover for a physiological 
malfunction which is not job-induced and which 
could have happened as easily away from work as 
at work. 
In that case the Court affirmed the award of death benefits to an 
employee's widow based on the idiopathic fall doctrine, which has 
no application here. The Findings of Fact in this case expressly 
state that: 
There is nothing to take her activity on that day 
out of the realm of what could be considered 
usual and normal activities . . . the same type 
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of injury could have just as easily occurred had 
she bent down to pick up a clothes basket or bag 
of groceries. 
R. 90. The facts in this case clearly show that there was no 
unusual exertion or occurrence and that Plaintiff's malfunction 
would have just as easily happened away from work. Nor do the 
facts demand the conclusion that her malfunction was job-induced. 
D. The Definition of Accident as Interpreted in Sabo is 
Supported by Strong Policy Considerations and Should Not 
be Discarded. 
This case is so closely governed by existing precedent, 
that to reverse the Commission would require overturning Sabo and 
the other cases discussed above which require the showing of an 
identifiable accident under circumstances such as those present in 
this case. Plaintiff's brief appears to indirectly request this 
result since it argues that Utah is in the minority position on 
this issue. Aside from the obvious problems with stare decisis 
such a decision would incur, the present definition of accident 
serves significant policy goals which have been well articulated 
by the Court. In Mason, the Court stated: 
It is also to be observed, that should the 
determination of the Commission be left to stand 
(i.e., award of benefits to applicant whose back 
was injured while unloading bags of whey), its 
practical effect would be to severely limit the 
employment prospects of those in the work-force 
who have existing physical limitations. 
Employers would simply be apt to refuse 
employment to those so afflicted rather than to 
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run the risk of having to bear the cost of 
compensation for non-accident oriented 
disabilities that may occur. 
606 P.2d at 240; see also, Redman, 454 P.2d at 285. 
To allow compensation in situations such as this where 
there is no preexisting injury and no identifiable accident would 
effectively change the impact of the Workmen's Compensation 
Statute. Its purpose has been to alter the common law tort rights 
between employers and employees for work-related injuries to 
permit the employee rapid, inexpensive recovery for them and to 
allow the employer to limit its total liability for such injuries. 
A broader definition of accident would effectively make employers 
insurers for all physiological malfunctions which happen to occur 
when the employee is at work. Redman, 454 P.2d at 285. While 
this may encourage people to work longer hours so that they may be 
covered if they develop a health problem while at work, it is more 
likely that the change will impose significant financial obliga-
tions on employers and cause discrimination against otherwise 
productive employees who have preexisting internal weaknesses. 
The "leading case" that petitioner relies upon for 
reversal is Purity Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, 115 
Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). That case, however, has been 
repeatedly critized. In Redman, the Court stated that it 
has been a nub of contention in legal circles, 
but in its 20 year lifespan it has not been 
overruled apodictically, nor given nourishment by 
an approbation. Purity enjoys a unique and 
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse. 
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454 P.2d at 286. Similarly, in Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 
19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967), the Court noted that it was 
"another 3 to 2 decision, which, decided in 1949, 18 years ago, in 
a long, difficult to understand opinion, which has never been 
cited by this Court or any other Court to support the law of that 
case. . . . The Purity Biscuit case certainly needs a healthy 
reappraisement. " Id. at 799-800. 
While Purity may have seemed revived in Schmidt, 617 P.2d 
at 693, Schmidt, as discussed above, stands on its own and is 
distinguishable from this action. Purity has not been cited by 
this Court since Schmidt. To resuscitate Purity the Court would 
have to repudiate its modern line of cases, including Sabo, 
Tarango, Mason, and Thurman. Respondent urges that the Court 
retain some meaning in the term "accident" in cases such as this 
and not permit employees to recover based on the "mere coincidence 
that (plaintiff's) injury or malfunction occurred at work." Sabo, 
642 P.2d at 726. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's finding of no accident in this case, 
where the Plaintiff's injury occurred while performing her 
ordinary tasks in her usual manner, in the absence of any 
preexisting problem, or any unusual stress or exertion, is not 
arbitrary or capricious. Clearly, reasonable minds would not be 
driven to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" that 
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an accident occurred. Accordingly, defendants request this Court 
affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission. 
Dated this /i""/<"day of May, 1986. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Thomas L. Kay S 
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M PETER HEILBRUN. M D 
THEODORE S ROBERTS. M D 
August 10, 1985 
Mark V. Anderson, M.D. 
2020 West 2200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Dear Doctor Anderson: 
RE: £ . Carmen Herrera Enp: Sperry llnivac 
D/I: May 6, 1985 
Ms. Herrera, age 25, a test specialist for Sperry Corp. was seen at 
your request August 6 for neurosurgical evaluation with persistent 
symptoms three months following low back stress: 
1. "My buttocks hurt. 
2. Low back ache. 
3. Upper back ache, headaches and I hurt all over." 
History: 
Ms. Herrera, who denies prior problems, states that on May 6; at work 
she was "lifting a computer unit that weighs about 25 lbs. and coming 
up after I picked it up felt a tingling and snap in my back". She 
was able to finish the day but the next day was sufficiently uncom-
fortable that she saw you, had X-rays and a CT scan and has been 
treated with physical therapy and anti-inflammatory medication. She 
reports an initial improvement which was slow and thereafter her con-
dition stabilized with these persistent complaints: 
Low back and buttocks - Her chief discomfort with a feeling of 
"bruised and pressure". More comfortable lying on her side 
with a pillow between her knees. Symptoms aggravated by walking, 
standing, bending over or sitting or walking up stairs. Sneezing 
hurts in the back. 
Left hip - Painful. 
Upper back - "Feels bruised". 
Headaches - Indicates right side behind the eye and in the occiput 
with numbness and pain in the back of the neck. 
These symptoms are fairly constant but she feels have "leveled off and/ 
or may.be worse". She attempted to return to work but was released, 
there being no duty not requiring lifting. She says she is depressed. 
A-l 
Mark V. Anderson, M.u. 
August 10, 1985 
RE: G. Carmen Herrera 
Your duplicates records are appreciated and noted. Included is a 
denial of industrial liability. 
Past History: 
Denies any medical problems or other significant trauma. Has had surgical 
reduction of a left hip dislocation and repair of ligamentous injury in 
the left knee and removal of a bone chip in the left foot. Familial 
background reviewed is negative. Inquiry by systems discloses no other 
problems. Patient has seasonal hayfever and becomes nauseated with 
Codeine. 
Examination: 
B'S", 137 lbs., a non-obese, healthy appearing, young woman in no evi-
dent physical distress. 
Physical Examination: Posture and gait are normal and there is a 
good range of lumbar mobility. Skin is normal except for surgical 
scars, peripheral pulses and joints normal. CHest and abdomen WNL. 
Neurologic Examination: Cranial nerves intact. Upper extremities 
symmetrically normal. In lower extremities strength and sensation 
are normal. Reflexes are sluggish but equal except that the left 
ankle jerk may be relatively diminished. Sciatic stretch sign 
is negative while straight leg elevation aggravates low back dis-
comfort. 
Supplemental Data and Comment: 
X-rays, 5-10-85, were reviewed: 
Lumbar spine - Normal. 
CT - Normal. Dr. Brinton's report, however, indicates question 
of lumbosacral level on the right but in the absence of the loss 
of epidural fat or evident displacement of nerve root or dural 
sac, I think this is speculative. 
I think there is a significant disparity between Ms. Herrera's complaints 
and any evidence clinically or by X-rays of any real pathology. At 
most I would feel she sustained a low back strain and I think the symp-
toms are probably functionally accentuated. 
All I could recommend is continuing on a conservative basis with physi-
cal therapy, anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxant medication, simple 
analgesics and continued observation in the event more specific symp-
toms and/or some objective clinical changes appear. In that event I 
think a myelogram would be desirable for hard, objective evidence, before 
considering intervention. 
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RE: 6. Carmen Herrera 
If time suggests that the psychophysiologic factor is a large element, 
then appropriate consultation would be advisable. 
Impression: 
1. History of low back stress sustained incident to lifting 5-6-85 
with: 
a. Persistent low back discomfort with radiation. 
b. Various subjective discomforts. 
c. Without objective clinical or X-ray evidence of 
specific pathology. 
2. Probable psychophysiologic reaction. 
Thanks for the opportunity of seeing Ms. Herrera. 
Cordially, 
H$fc a 
Chester B. Powell, M.D. 
CBP:cw 
ccr^The Travelers Insurance 
Utah Industrial Ocnmission 
D: 8-7-85 
T: 8-10-85 
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